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Abstract: Health insurance reform in Massachusetts lowered the financial cost of both pregnancy 
(by increased coverage of pregnancy-related medical events) and pregnancy prevention (by 
increasing access to reliable contraception and family planning). We examine fertility responses 
for women of childbearing age in Massachusetts and, on net, find no effect from increasing 
health insurance coverage. This finding, however, masks substantial heterogeneity. For married 
women aged 20 to 34 – who have high latent fertility and for whom pregnancies are typically 
wanted – fertility increased by approximately 1 percent. For unmarried women in the same age 
range – for whom pregnancies are typically unwanted – fertility declined by 9 percent. Fertility 
rates changed very little for other groups, in part because of low latent fertility or minimal gains 
in insurance coverage. Pregnancy wantedness increased in the aggregate through a combination 
of increasing wanted births and decreasing unwanted births. 
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I. Introduction 
Although the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 is the first 
successful attempt in the U.S. to provide near-universal health insurance coverage at the national 
level, similar policies have been implemented at state and local levels in prior years.1 Among 
these regional reforms, the Massachusetts health care law of 2006 – which includes an individual 
mandate requiring all state residents to obtain health insurance – is the most prominent. Over the 
years, researchers have used the Massachusetts experience to determine how its new health care 
law affected health coverage, outcomes, costs, and other critical issues. Given that the 
Massachusetts legislation served as a model for the design of the ACA, the answers to these 
questions have broader implications at the national level. 
It is well established that coverage rates increased and out-of-pocket costs of expensive 
medical events (like pregnancy), decreased as a result of the Massachusetts reform.2 Thus, the 
reduced cost of pregnancy may have incentivized women of childbearing age who were 
previously uninsured to plan and carry out a pregnancy. High-cost, anticipated medical events 
like pregnancy may have been even further subsidized due to the opportunity for adverse 
selection embedded in the structure of the regulations: even with the law’s individual mandate, 
consumers are given the option to remain uninsured by paying a penalty or purchasing less 
comprehensive coverage.3 They can also fairly easily move in and out of more generous plans. 
                                                          
1 Maine, Vermont, and San Francisco enacted reforms in 2003, 2006, and 2007 respectively. 
Massachusetts enacted the “Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health 
Care” in 2006. The first three reforms relied on subsidies for purchasing health insurance, while 
the Massachusetts law also included more far-reaching provisions. 
2 Birth-related expenses in the U.S. ranged from $10,657 to $23,927 in 2011 (U.S. Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2013). 
3 For example, catastrophic health insurance plans offered under the ACA are available to those 
under age 30. It covers essential health benefits (including maternity and newborn care) but the 
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Thus, women might purchase more comprehensive coverage when anticipating pregnancy 
relative to those that do not plan to have children in the near future.4  
In addition to lowering the out-of-pocket costs of having a baby, the Massachusetts law 
also lowered the costs of preventing a pregnancy by increasing access to reliable contraception 
and family planning services. As a result, women who did not want to get pregnant might have 
increased their use of reliable birth control and thus decreased their fertility rates. In contrast to 
Massachusetts, the funding for birth control, family planning, and abortion has been very 
controversial under the ACA. Although all new health plans must cover certain women’s 
preventive services with no co-payments, including contraceptive counseling and the full range 
of FDA-approved contraception methods, the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby exempted closely held for-profit corporations if their owners religiously object to 
the contraceptive mandate.5 In addition, an executive order of the President prohibits Federal 
funding for abortions.  
In this paper we use the exogenous changes generated by Massachusetts’ health care 
reform to identify the effect of insurance coverage on fertility. We rely on the American 
Community Survey (ACS), which explicitly asks questions on fertility. Straightforward 
difference-in-differences estimates reveal no change in fertility. Since baseline insurance 
coverage rates varied based on socioeconomic characteristics (rather than just by state and year), 
we further parameterize the changes in insurance coverage. Even with this parameterized 
specification, we do not find an effect on realized fertility when we examine all women or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
high deductibles (approximately $6,300 for an individual) would likely deter many women who 
anticipate pregnancy from purchasing such a policy. 
4 Feldstein (2013) argues such a design will encourage those who are healthy to strategically 
remain uninsured until they have a potentially costly medical diagnosis. Marton and Yelowitz 
(2014) find evidence of conditional coverage in the Medicaid system. 
5 See http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf. 
4 
 
stratify the sample by age alone. Our key finding emerges when we stratify by both age and 
marital status: insurance coverage increased pregnancy for married women aged 20 to 34 by 
roughly 1 percent and decreased pregnancy for unmarried women of the same age by 9 percent. 
These opposite-signed results reflect different degrees of pregnancy wantedness and different 
behavioral responses to insurance coverage. These effects cancel out in the aggregate. Fertility 
for teenagers and older women did not change, which is unsurprising since teenagers 
experienced small gains in insurance coverage (hence, identification is more difficult) and older 
women have low fertility rates (hence, there is a heterogeneous behavioral response). The results 
are fairly robust to the inclusion of different sets of control variables and a variety of 
specification checks. We also examine and confirm some of the underlying assumptions 
regarding pregnancy wantedness, physician access, and contraceptive use – all necessary 
conditions for finding opposite-signed fertility effects. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: Section II surveys the existing 
literature on the Massachusetts health insurance reform and fertility responses to expanding 
health insurance coverage. Section III provides a description of the legislative changes in 
Massachusetts. Section IV discusses the expected fertility effects from expanding health 
insurance coverage and shows how the response should vary with observable characteristics. 
Section V describes the data. Section VI presents the empirical framework and the findings. 
Underlying assumptions are examined in Section VII, and Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
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This paper contributes to an emerging literature evaluating the Massachusetts health care 
reform, in which insurance coverage and health care utilization are two principal outcomes.6 Our 
study is the first to examine fertility behavior in this setting. 
Several studies examine the effect of the Massachusetts reform on insurance coverage 
(Long, 2008; Long Stockley, and Yemane, 2009; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012a). There is 
consensus that coverage rates increased, although there is disagreement on the magnitude.7 The 
gains in health insurance coverage varied with socioeconomic characteristics because of 
heterogeneous baseline coverage: effects were large among young and low-income adults while 
modest for older and wealthier individuals (Niedzwiecki, 2013). The reform caused little change 
in coverage for children and teenagers because they were already overwhelmingly eligible under 
a parent’s plan or through Medicaid (Long, Stockley, and Yemane, 2009; Miller, 2012b).  
The reform also affected healthcare utilization and increased efficiency: the use of 
preventive health care services increased (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012a; Niedzwiecki, 2013) and 
the use of emergency rooms fell (Miller 2012a; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012a).8 
Most work focusing on fertility-related moral hazard effects examines Medicaid 
expansions from the 1980s and 1990s and largely finds a heterogeneous response based on 
demographics.9 Several studies find different responses by white women (Joyce, Kaestner, and 
Kwan, 1998; Zavodny and Bitler, 2010; Yelowitz, 1994; DeLeire, Lopoo and Simon, 2011) and 
                                                          
6 Other outcomes include health (Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014; Miller 2012b; Yelowitz and 
Cannon; 2010), insurance crowd-out (Long, 2008; Miller 2012b; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012a; 
Yelowitz and Cannon, 2010), labor markets (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012b), and adverse 
selection (Hackmann, Kolstrad, and Kowalski, 2012). 
7 Official estimates for the uninsured rate in Massachusetts in 2008 were 2.6 percent, but 
Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) find that uninsured rates are underreported because the reform 
incentivizes people to hide their true status if they are uninsured. 
8 Niedzwiecki (2013) finds an overall increase in emergency room visits, however. 
9 Leibowitz (1990) finds temporary increases in pregnancy rates and births using the RAND 
health insurance experiment from the 1970s. 
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typically no population-wide effect (Zavodny and Bitler, 2010; DeLeire, Lopoo and Simon, 
2011). Some also find racial differences in terms of abortion rates (Zavodny and Bitler, 2010; 
Joyce, Kaestner, and Kwan, 1998; Joyce and Kaestner, 1996). 
The increased availability of health insurance also lowers the individual’s cost of 
preventing pregnancy, because almost all health plans cover contraception (and some plans cover 
abortion). The publicly subsidized “Commonwealth Care” plan in Massachusetts covers a full 
range of family planning services, including abortion care. Dennis et al. (2012) found that, after 
the reform, access to affordable contraception improved for low-income women even though 
they faced new challenges in navigating the system. By providing particular subgroups with a 
source of entry into the formal health care system, family planning community centers helped 
overcome such navigation obstacles (Dennis, et al., 2009; Gold, 2009). 
Noting that Medicaid has covered contraception since 1972, Kearney and Levine (2009) 
examined the impact of Medicaid eligibility for family planning services on birth rates and 
contraceptive use among different demographic groups. They find the largest effects among 18- 
to 24-year-old women, where birth rates declined by up to 6.8 percentage points due to higher 
contraceptive use. Their findings provide motivation for analyzing fertility responses separately 
by demographic group because latent fertility and pregnancy wantedness vary. 
In summary, the literature indicates that the Massachusetts reform achieved its goal of 
expanding insurance coverage although the effects differed by socioeconomic groups. The 
reform also led to increased utilization of health care services. Studies focusing on Medicaid 
expansions generally find that fertility behavior varies by demographic group, with little 
evidence for an overall effect. Expanding family planning services, which increases the 
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availability and use of contraception, has been found to be effective in reducing unintended 
births. 
 
III. Timeline of the Massachusetts Health Care Reform 
The Massachusetts health care law dramatically changed the landscape of the state’s 
health insurance market. The implementation of the reform began in October 2006 and continued 
through July 2007 (see Table 1 for a timeline of its major stages; Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2012). During that transition period, the state expanded coverage under Medicaid and the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) for children with family incomes up to 300 percent 
of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). The law also raised enrollment caps for adults and allowed 
adults younger than 26 years to remain on their parent’s plan. In addition, the state provided full 
coverage to individuals with family incomes up to 150 percent of FPL and subsidized coverage 
on a sliding-scale basis for those with incomes between 151 and 300 percent of FPL. 
The individual mandate, which became effective July 2007, required individuals to 
purchase health insurance or pay a fine. The penalty was equal to their personal state income tax 
exemption in the first year and up to 50 percent of the lowest health insurance premium for 
which they would be eligible in subsequent years. Penalties for not complying with the mandate 
started in December 2007. 
For insurance companies, the law stipulated minimum coverage, modified community-
rated premiums, and maximum premiums irrespective of preexisting health conditions and 
claims history. Employers with 11 or more full-time employees were required to offer health 
insurance or face modest penalties. 
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IV. Predicted Effects of Expanding Health Insurance Coverage on Fertility 
Predicting the effects of health insurance reform on pregnancy is complicated because of 
several other elements, such as latent fertility (proxied by age) and wantedness of children 
(proxied by marital status) factor into the decision to have a baby. Younger women have higher 
fertility rates than older women, because older women are both more likely to have reached their 
desired family composition and more likely to suffer from infertility.10 All else equal, single 
women are less likely to become pregnant because pregnancies are more likely to be unplanned 
and unwanted. These considerations suggest that if the expansion of health insurance coverage 
has effects on fertility, they would vary by age and marital status. Our hypothesis is that, all else 
equal, expanding insurance coverage will decrease the fertility of single women (unwanted 
pregnancies) due to better access to reliable contraception, while increasing the fertility of 
married women (wanted pregnancies) due to lowering the out-of-pocket cost of pregnancy. In 
addition, as health insurance becomes more widely available, births by younger women should 
increase more than those by older women due to the former group’s higher latent fertility rates. 
The baseline distribution of insurance coverage pre-reform also varied by age and marital 
status. There were clearly gains in Massachusetts (relative to the rest of New England) from 
2008 onward (relative to the period between 2003 and 2006). Moreover, the gains in 
Massachusetts after the reform varied by family income: some groups experienced minimal gains 
in insurance (such as relatively affluent women over 300 percent of FPL who were often covered 
by private insurance), while others experienced much larger gains (such as “near-poor” women 
with incomes between 150 and 300 percent of FPL).  
                                                          
10 Around one-third of couples in which the woman is over 35 years old have fertility problems. 
See http://www.womenshealth.gov/publications/our-publications/fact-sheet/infertility.html, 
accessed 11/20/2013. 
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Larger gains in coverage should lead to larger fertility responses within each age-marital 
status cell. Figure 1 summarizes the directional expected fertility rate by age, marital status, and 
income, which roughly reflect variations in latent fertility, child wantedness, and insurance gains. 
A woman who is young, single (married), and near-poor, would experience larger relative gains 
in insurance coverage and would be relatively less (more) likely to have a baby after the reform 
than her more affluent counterpart.  
It is also important to highlight the interaction of age and marital status. One would 
expect that the fertility responses for older women – regardless of whether pregnancies were 
wanted or insurance gains were large – would be much smaller due to lower latent fertility. For 
teenagers, one might expect smaller fertility responses as well because the insurance gains were 
typically much smaller. 
 
V. Data Description: American Community Survey, Current Population Survey, and Vital 
Statistics 
Our primary data source is the Census Bureau’s ACS Public Use Microdata Sample 
(PUMS). We use the one-year sample of the ACS PUMS for the years 2003-2011.11 Starting 
with the 2005 PUMS, approximately one percent of all households in the U.S. were surveyed (in 
2003 and 2004, the samples are approximately 40 percent the size of subsequent years). As a 
consequence, we are able to examine the fertility responses in Massachusetts relative to other 
New England states. Moreover, we are able to examine responses for narrow demographic 
groups, such as married women aged 20 to 34, for which we can more accurately characterize the 
                                                          
11 We exclude the transition year of 2007 when the reform was being phased in. 
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wantedness of pregnancies and latent fertility. Unlike most household surveys, respondents are 
required by law to participate in the ACS.12 
Relevant for our purposes, the ACS directly asks fertility questions for each woman of 
childbearing age. Specifically, the survey asks, “Has this person given birth to any children in the 
past 12 months?” Other datasets do not directly ask about fertility; instead, one might impute 
fertility from the presence of an infant on the household roster. Such an imputation strategy 
would encounter difficulty in assigning a given infant to a given mother if there was more than 
one woman of childbearing age in the household. Perhaps more importantly, the ACS reveals 
that many infants are not living with their mothers: as Table 2 shows, only 81 percent of 
households where a birth was reported had an infant present. While this non-presence can in 
large part be attributed to socioeconomic circumstances, some of it simply reflects confusion 
about the wording of the survey question because the fraction of households reporting a birth 
who also have a zero- or one-year-old present is 88 percent.13 Nonetheless, an important 
difference exists between births and the presence of very young children: roughly 8 percent of 
infants live in a household where there is not a woman reporting a birth. 
In Table 3, we show that the modest disconnect between reported births and presence of 
infants is related to socioeconomic circumstances. We examine 242,006 women aged 15 to 44 
who reported a birth (and where that woman was the only one in the household to so report) in 
the 2003-2011 ACS across the entire U.S. The outcome of interest is whether an infant (defined 
as age zero) is missing on the household roster. Unmarried, non-white, and less-educated women 
                                                          
12 Source: 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/language_brochures/ACSQandA_ENG10.pdf. See 
Title 13, United States Code, Sections 141, 193, and 221. The decennial Census is a notable 
exception in that it is mandatory. 
13 If a household misinterpreted “the last 12 months” with “the last year” or “the last calendar 
year”, they might report a one-year-old as a birth. 
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are far more likely – 8 to 12 percentage points – to not have a baby present in the household. 
This may be unsurprising if the father lives in a separate household or if members of the 
extended family, such as grandparents, typically take care of the child. More surprisingly, the 
likelihood of missing infants increases sharply with age: 35- to 39-year-olds are 6 percentage 
points more likely to not have an infant present, while 40- to 44-year-olds are nearly 24 
percentage points more likely to not have an infant present. These age results should be 
interpreted differently than the socioeconomic results, however. Fertility is quite low among 
these age groups – especially 40- to 44-year-olds – and many of the affirmative responses to the 
fertility question could be reporting errors. Given this possibility, we break out our empirical 
analysis by age group. 
The ACS has one unfortunate drawback: it did not start asking questions on health 
insurance until 2008, which is the beginning of the “post” period. We rely, instead, on the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) to derive insurance rates, and append these rates to each 
woman in the ACS sample. Using the 2004-2012 CPS March Supplements, which cover 
calendar years 2003-2011, we compute coverage rates for women by demographic category, 
region, and time.14 We do this separately for Massachusetts and the other five New England 
states combined (Connecticut, Vermont, Maine, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire). The 
demographic categories are based on age, income, and marital status. There are six age groups 
(15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 34, 35 to 39, 40 to 44), four income groups (<150% FPL, 150-
250% FPL, 250-300% FPL, >300% FPL), and two marital statuses (married and unmarried). For 
                                                          
14 It is thought that CPS answers to health insurance questions are a blend of current coverage 
and coverage in the previous year. Swartz (1986) argues that CPS respondents ignore the precise 
wording of the health insurance questions, and instead answer the question as if it referred to 
coverage as of the survey date. A similar approach was used by DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon 
(2011) where the policy variable is an index of Medicaid eligibility that varies by quarter, state, 
year, and demographic cell based on age, race, marital status, and education. 
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each demographic group, we create coverage rates for two regions (Massachusetts and the rest of 
New England) and two periods (the “before” period including calendar years 2003-2006 and the 
“after” period including calendar years 2008-2011).15 The total number of groups is therefore 
192 (6 ages x 4 incomes x 2 marital statuses x 2 regions x 2 periods). A woman is defined as 
“uninsured” if she is not covered by private health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or 
CHAMPUS/Tricare military health insurance. The insurance coverage rate is then the ratio of the 
number of insured women in each cell to the total number of women in the cell. 
Insurance coverage rates were highest among teenagers (15- to 19-year-olds) and older 
women (aged 35 to 44) both in Massachusetts and the rest of New England in 2003-2006 (Figure 
2a). This is expected because teenagers are typically covered under their parents’ health 
insurance plan or Medicaid and older adults are more likely to be insured due to improved 
economic circumstances. The age groups with lowest coverage rates were 20- to 24- and 25- to 
29-year-olds because young adults leaving college were often no longer covered on a parent’s 
plan and less likely to have a job that provides health insurance coverage. The gains in insurance 
coverage in Massachusetts following the reform, therefore, were most pronounced for these age 
groups (Figures 2b and 2c); coverage increased by almost 13 percentage points for 20- to 24-
year-olds and 8 percentage points for 25- to 29-year-olds. The changes among teens and older 
                                                          
15 We follow the existing literature in treating 2006 as a “before” year because the earliest 
provisions went into effect in October 2006. See Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2012), 
Long, Stockley, and Yemane (2009), and Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), all of whom use annual 
data. Given the time horizon for pregnancy, and the wording of the question in the ACS, the vast 
majority of pregnancies in this year would have been prior to the reform. In addition, the ACS 
respondents take the survey throughout the year (and it is not possible for us to identify the date 
when the survey was answered). Virtually all studies classify 2007 – midway through which the 
individual mandate was implemented – as a transition year. Our interest lies in the effects of the 
fully phased-in reform; thus we focus on 2008 onward as the “after” period. 
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adults were quite modest in comparison. In contrast to Massachusetts, the rest of New England 
experienced relatively small gains and even reductions in coverage rates for some age groups. 
Figure 3 shows that coverage rates are higher for married women than unmarried women, 
because of the availability of spousal health insurance coverage (Bernstein, et al., 2008). 
Massachusetts’ reform had an equalizing effect for unmarried women: insurance coverage 
increased by almost 7 percentage points. Figure 4 illustrates the changes in coverage rates by 
income. Insurance coverage was initially highest for women with incomes over 300 percent of 
FPL, and the coverage gains were very small (2 percentage points). The coverage gains were 
also somewhat limited for the poorest women (with incomes less than 150 percent of FPL) 
because many had health insurance through Medicaid (Sommers, et al., 2012). In contrast, the 
middle group (with incomes between 150 to 300 percent of FPL) saw increases in insurance 
coverage of 12 to 16 percentage points. 
Finally, although women between 15 and 44 are often categorized as being of 
childbearing age, birth rates vary tremendously by age group. Older women in the sample are 
more likely to have reached their desired number of children and, as such, one may not expect 
the same fertility response to insurance coverage that younger women would demonstrate. We 
calculate a latent fertility variable that represents the propensity of a woman to give birth that 
varies by age and marital status. To construct the latent fertility rate, we combine two datasets: 
the 2003 Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Vital Statistics data, which records 
all births in the United States, and ACS data from 2003.  
For the numerator, we use CDC’s 2003 natality data to establish baseline fertility rates 
for 12 demographic cells – six age groups (15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 34, 35 to 39, and 40 
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to 44) and two marital statuses (married and unmarried). For the denominator, we use ACS data 
from 2003 to obtain the total number of women within each demographic cell.16 
To compute the latent fertility variable for married women aged 20 to 24 years, for 
example, we divide the number of births from women in this demographic cell (483,843) by the 
total number of women in the U.S. within this same cell (2,255,895) and obtain a latent fertility 
rate of 21.4 percent. The inverted-U shape of latent fertility in Figure 5a illustrates wide 
variations in the propensity for having a baby, with women aged 20 to 34 being most likely to 
give birth. Birth rates among married women are significantly higher for each age group than for 
unmarried women (Figure 5b). Although not shown, conditional on age and marital status, race 
is not an important factor affecting latent fertility. These fertility rates provide strong motivation 
for stratifying the sample, both by age alone and by age and marital status. 
 
VI. Empirical Framework and Results 
VI.1 Empirical Framework 
As is well recognized, the Massachusetts reform creates a quasi-experiment to evaluate 
the impact of expanding health insurance coverage. The natural starting point for our 
examination of fertility is a straightforward difference-in-differences (DD) estimator estimated 
from a linear probability model:17 
(1) 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an dummy variable equal to one if woman i in state j at time period t had a 
child in the past 12 months, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖 is a dummy variable for living in Massachusetts (relative to 
the other New England states – Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
                                                          
16 Results were virtually identical using data from 2011. 
17 Results from a probit model are similar. 
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Vermont), and 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝐵𝑖 is a dummy variable for the years 2008 and beyond (relative to the years 
2003-2006). We also include controls for the woman’s education (high school dropout, high 
school graduate, college graduate is omitted), whether the woman has changed residence in the 
past year, whether she has served in the military and whether she is a non-U.S. citizen. The 
coefficient estimate on 𝛽1 is then interpreted as the DD estimator.
18 
Although transparent, there are reasons to go beyond the specification in equation (1). 
Most importantly, although the near-universal health reform in Massachusetts leveled coverage 
rates across groups, there were very different gains based on a woman’s initial socioeconomic 
circumstances. Thus, we create a parameterized version of equation (1) by attaching to each 
woman the insurance coverage rate based on her state, time period, and demographic group.19 
Thus, equation (2), which forms our baseline specification of insurance gains on fertility, is: 
(2) 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝐵𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the fraction of demographic group d covered in region j in period t.20 It is 
likely that the key components of 𝐵𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖 – especially demographics such as age and 
marital status – have a direct effect on fertility; thus, we include a full set of dummy variables for 
demographic group (𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐷𝑖), as well as state and year fixed effects (𝛿𝑠 and 𝛿𝑖). The estimate 
of the impact of insurance coverage, 𝛽1, is identified from how Massachusetts’ changing health 
                                                          
18 The large majority of papers studying the effect of the Massachusetts healthcare law use some 
form of difference-in-differences identification strategy. See, for example, Kolstad and Kowalski 
(2012a), Courtemanche and Zapata (2014), Yelowitz and Cannon (2010), Long et al. (2009), and 
Miller (2012a). 
19 Similar methods for constructing a policy variable are consistently used by the literature 
examining the effect of Medicaid expansions on various outcomes. This measure is typically the 
fraction of the population eligible for Medicaid (DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon, 2011; Zavodny and 
Bitler, 2010; Currie and Gruber, 2001). 
20 Since the variation in INSURED is at a higher level than the individual, all standard errors are 
clusters at the DEMOG*STATE*YEAR level. The significance of the results is very similar if 
we simply cluster at the STATE*YEAR level and the significance is much stronger if we cluster 
at the STATE level alone. Thus, we view our results at the most conservative approach. 
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insurance landscape over time interacted with different demographic groups. Since the 
identification of the insurance effect comes from the interaction of state, time, and demographics, 
we present further specifications that show the conclusions are relatively robust to including 
finer sets of controls. 
One key drawback to equation (2) is that such a specification imposes an equal marginal 
impact on fertility for gains in insurance coverage. There are clearly reasons to think this should 
not be the case.21 Older women are likely to have reached their desired number of children; as a 
consequence, one might not expect much impact on fertility for them. Moreover, gains in 
insurance coverage not only reduce the cost of having a baby, but also reduce the cost of 
preventing or aborting a pregnancy. One would expect that pregnancies are much more likely to 
be unwanted for single women, and wanted for married women. Thus, the estimate from 
equation (2) above could combine both positive and negative fertility responses. As a 
consequence, in addition to examining the full sample, we separately stratify by age group, and 
also age group and marital status.22 
 
VI.2 Basic Results 
The full sample consists of more than 500,000 women aged 15 to 44 in Massachusetts 
and surrounding states. Nearly 8 percent reported a birth in the past year. In addition, our 
imputed insurance rate is nearly 92 percent – reflecting both the changes in Massachusetts after 
2007, and the high overall level of coverage in New England. Consistent with the Vital Statistics 
data, fertility rates vary dramatically by woman’s age. Roughly 13 percent of women aged 20 to 
                                                          
21 Joyce, Kaestner, and Kwan (1998) only include young, single, and low-educated women in 
their sample. 
22 Zavodny and Bitler (2010) stratify their sample by race/marital status and race/education to 
analyze the fertility effects. 
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34 had a baby in the previous 12 months, a much higher rate than for women aged 15 to 19 or 35 
to 44. The fertility differences are especially pronounced by marital status; approximately 20 
percent of married women aged 20 to 34 reported having a baby, more than three times the rate 
of unmarried women in the same age group. 
Our first attempt at estimating the impact of insurance coverage on fertility is shown in 
Table 4, corresponding to the difference-in-differences specification in equation (1). For both the 
full sample, as well as each age group, one would conclude that the expansions in insurance had 
little effect on fertility. In all cases, the coefficient estimate is substantively small and 
insignificant. As noted, however, this specification ignores many important aspects about the 
fertility decision and the Massachusetts reform: in particular, the uneven gains in insurance 
coverage, the different latent fertility rates by age group, and the differential wantedness of 
pregnancies between married and unmarried women. 
Thus, we turn to Table 5, which estimates equation (2), by including the parameterized 
insurance rate. As in the previous table, when one looks at the full sample or particular age 
groups, insurance gains appear to have no effect on overall fertility. Yet, as shown in columns 
(4) and (5), there are opposite-signed effects for unmarried and married women aged 20 to 34. 
Although not shown, coefficient estimates are insignificant and much smaller for other 
age/marital status groups. For unmarried women aged 20 to 34, insurance coverage increased by 
11.4 percentage points due to the Massachusetts law.23 With a coefficient estimate of -0.0446, 
this would imply that fertility fell by -0.51 percentage points. Since the pre-reform baseline 
fertility in the ACS was 5.88 percent, then fertility fell by 8.7 percent. For married women in the 
same age group, gains in insurance coverage led to increased fertility. The overall gain in 
                                                          
23 We ran difference-in-difference estimates similar to equation (1) to calculate the change in 
insurance coverage. 
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insurance coverage was 2.3 percentage points, leading to an increase in fertility of 0.16 
percentage points from a much higher baseline of 20.2 percent. Thus, among married women, 
fertility increased by around 0.8 percent. 
The model in equation (2) assumes instant adjustment to newfound health insurance 
coverage. Although the individual mandate in Massachusetts started on July 1, 2007, the 
penalties for not complying with the mandate began at year-end and enrollment soared in 
December 2007 (Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight, 2011). This delayed enrollment, combined 
with lags in getting pregnant, delivering a baby, or obtaining birth control, suggests that the 
effects on fertility may be larger in post-reform years after 2008. We estimated the model in 
Table 5 – excluding 2008 – and find somewhat larger effects. For unmarried women, the 
coefficient (standard error) is -0.0567 (0.0240), or 27 percent larger. For married women, the 
estimates are 0.0771 (0.0506), or 12 percent larger. Thus, our baseline estimates appear to 
understate the longer-run effect on fertility. 
 
VI.3 Extensions 
Given the striking differences in insurance coverage for married and single women, one 
may ask whether the marriage decision itself is endogenous to the law. Yelowitz (1998) found 
that the expansions in Medicaid in the 1980s and 1990s led to higher marriage rates. The key 
difference between the Medicaid expansions and the more recent Massachusetts context is that 
Medicaid had been traditionally targeted to poor female-headed families on cash welfare. Hence 
the expansions in Medicaid opened up eligibility to married couples and on the margin, created 
incentives to get married. The expansion in Massachusetts, on the other hand, applied to all 
groups and was essentially neutral with respect to marriage. To verify this assumption, we run 
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difference-in-differences regressions (parallel to equation 1) in which the outcome is whether the 
woman is married; for both the full sample as well as each age group, the estimate is 
insignificant. 
One concern about Table 5 is that the INSURED variable is a complicated function that 
incorporates demographics, state, and year. Although we control for each of the main effects, 
interactions of DEMOG, STATE, and YEAR may directly impact fertility decisions independent 
of the expansions in health insurance coverage. For example, the Great Recession may have 
affected income or employment in Massachusetts differently than the rest of New England, and 
those differences – rather than health insurance coverage – could drive fertility decisions. In 
Table 6, we test the sensitivity of the coefficient estimates to these kinds of concerns for women 
aged 20 to 34. For comparison, column (1) replicates the specification from the prior table. In 
columns (2) and (3) we include state-specific time trends and STATE*YEAR effects, and 
observe that their inclusion have little impact on the underlying conclusions (if anything, the 
negative impact is stronger for unmarried women). Column (4) adds DEMOG*YEAR 
interactions (in addition to the STATE*YEAR interactions). The coefficient estimate for single 
women remains quite similar to the previous columns. For married women, the fertility effect is 
still positive and has a slightly higher magnitude. Finally, column (5) fully saturates the model, 
by including fixed effects for STATE*YEAR, DEMOG*YEAR, and DEMOG*STATE (thus, 
the identification comes only from the interaction of STATE*YEAR*DEMOG in the INSURED 
variable). It is reassuring that the actual coefficients retain their statistical significance and 
remain quite similar to the baseline estimates. Overall, the findings for both unmarried women 
and married women hold up well to including additional controls. 
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Another related concern about the specification is that differential, pre-existing, pre-
program trends in fertility might exist in Massachusetts and other states, and the specifications in 
Table 5 do not control for them. Figure 6 illustrates fertility rates for married and single women, 
aged 20 to 34, and at first blush, there appear to be no differences prior to the health insurance 
reform. Nonetheless, we control for the possible presence of such pre-program trends in our 
regressions by estimating a linear time trend for each of 72 demographic groups (i.e., 6 ages x 2 
marital statuses x 6 states; such as 20- to 24-year-old married women in Massachusetts) based 
only on pre-program fertility (i.e., using the years 2003 to 2006) in the ACS and generate 
predicted trend values for 2003 to 2011 (Chakrabarti and Roy, 2011). We then additionally 
control for fertility trends in the model. The results for health insurance coverage are 
qualitatively similar incorporating such trends, although the estimates are less precise. For 
example, the impact of health insurance coverage on unmarried women aged 20 to 34 is negative 
(and statistically significant), with a coefficient (standard error) of -0.0380 (0.0225). For married 
women aged 20 to 34, the results are no longer significant; the coefficient (standard error) is 
0.0581 (0.0491). 
There may also be a concern that the generous health insurance benefits in Massachusetts 
– with community-rated premiums and guaranteed issue – make the state a more attractive place 
for individuals with high expected medical costs – such as pregnant women – and, therefore, 
encourages migration. If this is the case, one might expect to see increases in fertility for all age 
groups, rather than increases for married women and decreases for unmarried women. 
Nonetheless, selective migration is clearly a theoretical concern.24 Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) 
                                                          
24 Gelbach (2004) shows that among women likely to use welfare, movers move to higher-
benefit states. Aizer, Currie and Moretti (2007) and Marton, Yelowitz and Talbert (2014) 
account for migration responses due to Medicaid. 
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find that in-migration in Massachusetts fell relative to other New England states as a result of the 
law, and this effect was particularly pronounced among adults aged 18 to 29. The result is 
consistent with a greater implicit tax on the young arising from community rating and individual 
mandates. The same factors that generate implicit taxes for the majority of young adults also 
create implicit subsidies for pregnant women. 
The ACS asks about one-year-migration patterns and allows us to test this hypothesis. 
We restrict the sample to women who did not move across state lines in the previous year, and 
estimate equation (2) on non-movers. Our results are quite similar to the baseline results in Table 
5. For the 94 percent of unmarried women aged 20 to 34 who did not move across state lines, the 
coefficient estimate (standard error) is now -0.0415 (0.0225) compared with the initial estimate 
of -0.0446 (0.0227). For the 95 percent of married women aged 20 to 34 who did not move 
across state lines, the coefficient estimate (standard error) is now 0.0704 (0.0543) compared with 
the initial estimate of 0.0689 (0.0498). Thus, the basic conclusions remain unchanged by 
restricting the sample to non-movers. 
Another concern is that some of the comparison states – in particular Maine and Vermont 
– made changes to their health care system. Maine enacted the “Dirigo Health Reform” in 2003 
and Vermont adopted “Catamount Health” in 2006, both of which subsidized the purchase of 
health insurance. Although Table 6 shows the fertility results for both single and married women 
are robust to the inclusion of state-trends or STATE*YEAR effects, we have also re-estimated 
the specification from Table 5 without Maine and Vermont. For single women aged 20 to 34, the 
coefficient estimate (standard error) is now -0.0477 (0.0246) and for married women the 
estimates are 0.0672 (0.0531). Comparing these coefficient estimates to those in column (1) of 
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Table 6, one can see that the exclusion of these states from the control group has little impact, a 
finding consistent with Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) and Courtemanche and Zapata (2014). 
Finally, we have examined an alternative definition of fertility. Recall that some women 
reported pregnancies but did not have infants living in the household, and on many dimensions 
the missing infants varied in logical ways with socioeconomic characteristics, such as marital 
status, race, and education. We have run similar specifications to our baseline result, but where 
childbirth is now defined as having an infant on the household roster. Such a measure creates 
difficulty in linking the infant to a mother when there are multiple women of childbearing age in 
a household, or when the mother is absent from the household. Although we continue to find 
reductions in fertility for unmarried women aged 20 to 34 and increases in fertility for married 
women aged 20 to 34, the coefficient estimates are roughly one-quarter to one-half as large and 
not statistically significant. This provides further evidence supporting the value of the self-
reported pregnancy question over an approach that imputes past pregnancy based on household 
configurations. 
In summary, although the expansions in health insurance coverage had zero net effect on 
fertility in Massachusetts, substantial heterogeneity exists for different demographic groups. Our 
findings suggest that latent fertility and the wantedness of children, along with differential gains 
in coverage, help explain opposite-signed effects for married and unmarried women aged 20 to 
34, and also explain the non-existence of effects for other groups. Married women in this age 
bracket increased their fertility when experiencing gains in insurance coverage because 
pregnancies are largely wanted and underlying fertility is high. Single women, on the other hand, 
decreased their fertility because pregnancies are largely unwanted and better access to 
contraception helps them prevent or terminate pregnancy. For women aged 35 and older, latent 
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fertility is relatively low (and insurance coverage was typically high prior to the reform), so the 
overall fertility responses are small (and statistically insignificant). For teenagers, fertility rates 
are also quite low, many pregnancies are unwanted, and insurance coverage was fairly high prior 
to the reform. Thus, we find small and statistically insignificant effects for them, too. 
 
VII. Exploring the Underlying Assumptions 
In this section we investigate two key relationships that lead to different fertility 
responses: the relationship between marital status and pregnancy wantedness and the relationship 
between insurance coverage and birth control methods. 
 
VII.1 Pregnancy Wantedness 
The explanation of our results rests on the assumption that children born to married 
women are typically wanted, while children born to single women are typically unwanted. We 
explore this with data from the Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS), an 
annual survey conducted by the CDC of women who had a live birth. New mothers participated 
within four months of giving birth and are asked about their attitudes towards the pregnancy.25 
We obtained data for Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont; Connecticut and New 
Hampshire did not participate in PRAMS. Massachusetts data is only available between 2007 
and 2010, while data for the other states are available from 2003 to 2011. 
Respondents are asked to report pregnancy wantedness right before becoming pregnant. 
Figure 7a shows that among married women who gave birth, 79 percent reported wanting to have 
                                                          
25 There are two parts to the survey: the core questions and state-specific questions. The core 
questions include attitudes and feelings about the most recent pregnancy, content and source of 
prenatal care, maternal alcohol and tobacco consumption, physical abuse before and during 
pregnancy, pregnancy-related morbidity, infant health care, and contraceptive use. 
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a baby; in contrast, the majority of single women reported unwanted pregnancies. It is likely that 
pregnancy wantedness is overstated for both groups of women because PRAMS does not survey 
women who had abortions. Forty percent of all unwanted pregnancies end in abortions, and 45 
percent of all abortions are obtained by single women.26 A back-of-the-envelope calculation 
using abortion statistics from the Guttmacher Institute implies that the proportion of unwanted 
pregnancies for single women is 68 percent (Figure 7b).27 
Next, we evaluate the impact of marital status on pregnancy wantedness for live births. 
Pregnancy wantedness equals “one” if the woman wanted to be pregnant right before becoming 
pregnant or sooner, and equals “zero” if the woman wanted to become pregnant later or did not 
want to become pregnant at all (Finer and Kost, 2011). Using a linear probability model, we 
regress pregnancy wantedness on marital status and incrementally add explanatory variables 
(mother’s age, education, race, number of previous live births, and insurance status) in Table 7.28 
Pregnancy wantedness is at least 20 percentage points higher for married women and is very 
stable regardless of specification. 
 
                                                          
26 See http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html (accessed on 06/06/2014). 
27 The PRAMS shows the number of unwanted live births to married and single women to be 
82,712 and 133,473, respectively. Since 60 percent of unintended pregnancies result in a birth 
and 40 percent result in abortion, the total number of unintended pregnancies is 360,308, of 
which there are 144,123 abortions. Approximately 45 percent of abortions are obtained by single 
women (64,855 abortions), while 55 percent are obtained by married women (79,268 abortions). 
Adding abortions to unwanted births reveals that 68 percent of all pregnancies for unmarried 
women are unwanted (compared with 59 percent when examining live births), while 34 percent 
of all pregnancies for married women are unwanted (compared with 21 percent when examining 
live births). 
28 Marital status is equal to 1 if the mother is married and 0 otherwise. There are 7 categories for 
mother’s age: less than 17 years old, 18-19 years old, 20 to 24 years old, 25 to 29 years old, 30 to 
34 years old, 35 to 39 years old, and over 40 years old. There are 5 categories for mother’s 
education: 0-8 years, 9-11 years, 12 years, 13-15 years, and 16 years or more. Mother’s race is 
equal to 1 if the mother is white and 0 otherwise. A woman is considered insured right before she 
became pregnant if she had any type of health insurance including Medicaid. 
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VII.2 Health Insurance Coverage, Physician Access, and Contraceptive Usage 
We next explore underlying behavioral responses to health insurance coverage, in 
particular whether single women switch to more reliable contraception methods (which typically 
require a doctor’s prescription). We use the CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS) to explore whether health insurance leads to greater physician access and whether 
access, in turn, affects contraceptive methods. 
The BRFSS is a telephone survey of personal health behaviors. The core questionnaire 
asks about health insurance and primary care physician access.29 Family planning questions are 
available intermittently (for the years 2004, 2006, 2010, and 2011) and only asked for 
respondents in all states in 2004.30 We therefore restrict our analysis to the 2004 BRFSS. 
We first examine the relationship between the availability of health insurance and access 
to a primary care provider. Health insurance coverage equals “one” if the person has any kind of 
health care coverage, or “zero” otherwise. Physician access equals “one” if the respondent 
reported that she thinks of one or more people as a personal doctor or health care provider. All 
specifications examine women of childbearing age, but exclude women who use permanent 
contraceptive methods or have partners who use permanent contraceptive methods.31 Table 8 
                                                          
29 The question about health insurance coverage is: “Do you have any kind of healthcare 
coverage, including health insurance, prepaid plans such as HMOs, or government plans such as 
Medicare?” The question about doctor access is: “Do you have one person you think of as your 
personal doctor or healthcare provider?” 
30 The family planning module was included in the survey by the following states: Arizona, 
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, and Wisconsin in 2006; Delaware, Florida, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, and Montana in 2010; Arizona, South Carolina, and Tennessee in 2011. 
31 The median age of women using permanent contraception is higher than the median age of 
women using temporary forms of birth control (37 versus 32), since completed fertility is 
positively correlated with age. Agüero and Marks (2011) discuss measurement error in self-
reported measures of fertility, such as the fear of revealing fertility problems to a survey taker. 
Reporting issues would likely lead to attenuation bias in the regression models on contraception 
use. 
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estimates a linear probability model, where access to a health care provider is regressed on health 
insurance coverage, while incrementally controlling for additional factors in the remaining 
columns. The coefficient on health insurance is positive, highly significant, and implies a 30-
percentage point increase in access. This effect is present for the full sample, as well as for 
married and unmarried women. 
Having established that insurance coverage is positively associated with physician access, 
we next examine the role of access on contraceptive use. The top half of Table 9 shows – for all 
women as well as by marital status – a strong positive relationship between physician access and 
overall contraceptive use. Having access to a physician increases contraceptive use by 
approximately 5 percentage points for single women, and by approximately 3 percentage points 
for married women. The bottom half of the table examines the use of reliable contraceptive 
methods. Contraceptive methods that have less than a 12 percent typical failure rate are classified 
as effective, and include intrauterine devices, implants, shots, pills, contraceptive patches, 
diaphragms, and cervical rings and caps.32 Condoms, emergency contraception, withdrawal, and 
rhythm are some of the less effective contraceptive methods. Having access to a primary care 
physician is positively associated with using more effective contraceptive methods, of 
approximately 9 percentage points. The effect for single women is generally larger than the 
effect for married women, and the magnitudes suggest both an overall increase in contraceptive 
use for single women, and a shift towards more reliable methods. 
                                                          
32 The most reliable, non-permanent, forms of contraception include IUDs and implants (with 
less than 1 pregnancy per 100 women each year), and shots, pills, rings and patches (with 2-9 
pregnancies per 100 women each year). Each requires a doctor’s prescription or contact with a 
healthcare provider. Less reliable forms of contraception (with between 15-25 pregnancies per 
100 women) include diaphragms, male condoms, female condoms, withdrawal, sponges, cervical 
caps, and spermicide. These typically do not require contact with physicians or healthcare 
providers. See http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/birth-control/birth-control-
effectiveness-chart-22710.htm, (accessed 11/19/2013). 
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The contraception findings are consistent with the findings on pregnancy wantedness: if a 
single woman obtains health insurance and better access to physicians, she is more likely to use 
contraception or to switch to reliable contraception because pregnancy wantedness is lower. As 
importantly, the overall magnitudes are consistent with the reduction in fertility for single 
women. Recall that insurance coverage increased by 11.4 percentage points for single women 
aged 20 to 34. Such gains would lead to a roughly 3.5 percentage point increase in access to 
primary care physicians (Table 8). And the increase in access then leads to roughly a 0.4 
percentage point increase in reliable contraception use (Table 9). This is the same order of 
magnitude as the reduction in fertility of -0.51 percentage points (Table 5). 
 
VIII. Conclusions and Discussion 
We examine the effect of the Massachusetts health care reform on a woman’s probability 
of having a baby. Although we find zero net effect on fertility for women aged 20 to 34, this 
ignores substantial heterogeneity across married and unmarried women (which proxies for child 
wantedness). Among young single women, fertility decreased by 9 percent while fertility 
increased by 1 percent for young married women. We find no effect on birth rates for teens or 
older women. 
Whether the reform shifted the timing of births or changed the total number births 
remains an open question. Evidence from other policy contexts suggests the importance of 
timing considerations (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra, 1999; Gans and Leigh, 2009; Neugart and 
Ohlsson, 2013; LaLumia, Sallee, and Turner, 2013; Schulkind and Shapiro, 2014). Furthermore, 
abortion and birth-control access have been found to affect life-cycle fertility in the U.S. and 
abroad (Ananat, Gruber, and Levine, 2007; Pop-Eleches, 2010). Data over a longer period are 
28 
 
needed to assess the long-run effects. Regardless of whether the reforms reflect timing or level 
effects, the proportion of unintended pregnancies – those that are mistimed, unplanned, or 
unwanted – fell as a result of the reform. 
Our results have implications for the ACA. Expanding insurance would likely increase 
wanted pregnancies on a national level and decrease unwanted births. There are three reasons to 
believe the fertility reductions for single women in Massachusetts were smaller than what would 
occur from the ACA. First, even prior to reform, health insurance coverage was quite high in 
Massachusetts; nearly 90 percent of the Massachusetts population had insurance compared with 
roughly 85 percent for the U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). Larger changes in 
insurance coverage would lead to larger reductions in fertility for single women. Second, 
abortion and family planning services are more accessible in Massachusetts even without 
insurance (Guttmacher Institute, 2015), leading to a smaller role for fertility reductions due to 
effective contraception. Third, the fraction of pregnancies that are unintended (unwanted or 
mistimed) is lower in Massachusetts than many other states (Finer and Kost,  2011). The 
combination of these factors – larger insurance gains, lower access to family planning, and 
greater unwantedness – suggests a larger impact from the set-up of the health insurance 
marketplaces in 2014 and the employer mandate in 2015 from the ACA. One possible limiting 
factor is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby exempted closely held 
corporations from providing coverage of contraception if such provisions violate the owners’ 
religious beliefs. Although a non-trivial share of employment in the private sector derives from 
closely held corporations, large employers overwhelmingly offered contraception prior to the 
mandate (Griswold, 2014), suggesting the actual impact would be minor. 
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A reduction in unwanted births – either in fertility levels or timing and spacing – could 
have favorable implications for child investment (Buckles and Munnich, 2012) or societal 
outcomes such as criminal activity (Donohue and Levitt, 2001). Reducing unwanted births may 
also lead to increased investment in a woman’s own human capital and the human capital of her 
children. Ultimately, the potential savings may be far greater than the financial resources 
currently spent on unintended pregnancies, at both the level of the individual and society. 
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Table 1: Implementation Timeline for the Massachusetts Health Care Reform  
April 2006 • Health Care Reform legislation passed 
 
July 2006 • Federal Government approves Medicaid waiver for health care reform 
 
October 2006 • Plan Type I for Commonwealth Care open for enrollment (for residents at 
100% of FPL) 
 
January 2007 • Plan Types II, III and IV for Commonwealth Care open for enrollment (for 
residents between 100% and 300% of FPL) 
 
March 2007 • Deadline for Connector Board to set minimum “creditable” coverage 
standards 
 
May 2007 • Commonwealth Choice plans become available (individuals and small 
businesses can buy insurance) 
 
July 1, 2007 • Individual mandate to purchase health insurance becomes effective 
• Deadline for employers to provide health insurance to full-time employees 
• Deadline for individual and small-group insurance markets to merge 
 
January 2008 • Individual mandate penalty becomes effective: 50% of premium per month if 
uninsured 
 
Sources: See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Focus on Health Reform,”, June 2007, 
accessed on 11/16/2013 at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7494-
02.pdf; State of Massachusetts, “Massachusetts Health Care Reform Fact Sheet,” accessed on 
11/16/2013 at www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/mrc/health-care-reform-fact-sheet.rtf 
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Table 2: Fraction of Households with Minimum Age of Zero 
 
 Percent of households 
reporting a birth 
Percent of households not 
reporting a birth 
Percent of households 
reporting a birth that include a 
zero-year-old 
All 
Years 81.14% 0.21% 92.24% 
2011 78.52% 0.18% 92.26% 
2010 80.17% 0.18% 92.89% 
2009 80.73% 0.17% 93.74% 
2008 80.60% 0.19% 93.28% 
2006 82.49% 0.24% 91.56% 
2005 82.82% 0.26% 91.26% 
2004 83.83% 0.27% 90.93% 
2003 82.08% 0.30% 89.81% 
Notes: Households reporting a birth include all households where any woman aged 15-44 
answered yes to the ACS fertility question: “Has this person given birth to any children in the 
past 12 months?” Otherwise, the household is classified as not having a birth. Tabulations 
include households only if the youngest householder’s age is not imputed. All households in the 
U.S. are used in tabulations. Tabulations are unweighted. Source of questions: Q.24 (2011 
Survey Instrument) (asked of women of childbearing age). Similar question on other surveys. 
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Table 3: Baby Not Present In Household Among Women Reporting Birth 
Age 20 to 24 -0.0074 (0.0068) 
Age 25 to 29 -0.0052 (0.0088) 
Age 30 to 34 0.0119 (0.0089) 
Age 35 to 39 0.0566 (0.0113) 
Age 40 to 44 0.2376 (0.0156) 
Married -0.0886 (0.0027) 
Income 150-250% FPL 0.0367 (0.0025) 
Income 250-300% FPL 0.0425 (0.0031) 
Income 300%+ FPL 0.0565 (0.0031) 
White -0.081 (0.004) 
High School Dropout 0.1195 (0.0039) 
High School Graduate 0.0718 (0.0026) 
Non-mover 0.0018 (0.0024) 
Military service -0.0104 (0.0053) 
Non-citizen 0.0056 (0.0039) 
𝐵2 0.0524 
Notes: Sample is based on 242,006 women aged 15-44 giving birth in past year in the U.S., and 
is limited to households in which exactly one woman indicated she had given birth that year. 
“Baby not present” refers to a household that does not have a zero-year-old. Households were 
excluded if the youngest member’s age was imputed. In addition to the variables shown above, 
specifications include state fixed effects and year fixed effects. Omitted categories include Age 
15 to 19, Unmarried, Income 0-150% FPL, Non-white, College Graduate, Mover, Non-military 
and Citizen.  
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Table 4: Difference-in-differences Estimates of the Impact of Health Reform on Fertility 
MASS*POST 0.0002 
(0.0027) 
-0.0018 
(0.0034) 
0.0017 
(0.0050) 
0.0016 
(0.0043) 
-0.0010 
(0.0089) 
0.0006 
(0.0030) 
MASS -0.0017 
(0.0023) 
-0.0015 
(0.0027) 
-0.0123 
(0.0038) 
-0.0054 
(0.0029) 
0.0033 
(0.0073) 
0.0081 
(0.0023) 
POST -0.0014 
(0.0020) 
0.0002 
(0.0027) 
-0.0080 
(0.0045) 
0.0005 
(0.0040) 
0.0054 
(0.0085) 
-0.0023 
(0.0025) 
N 510,707 79,350 210,970 114,522 96,448 220,387 
𝐵2 0.0089 0.0121 0.0038 0.0268 0.0046 0.0090 
Fertility rate 
(pre-reform) 
0.0792 0.0141 0.1301 0.0588 0.2017 0.0552 
Sample All Ages 15 to 
19 
Ages 20-34 Ages 20-
34, 
Unmarried 
Ages 20-
34, 
Married 
Ages 35 to 
44 
Notes: All standard errors are clustered at the STATE*YEAR level. The “pre” period is 2003-
2006 and the “post” period is 2008-2011. The treatment state is Massachusetts, and the control 
states are Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Dependent variable 
is: “Has this person given birth to any children in the past 12 months?” Individual controls 
included in regression are: education (dropout, high school graduate, college graduate), non-
mover, military service, and non-citizen. Women are included in the analysis if they are aged 15-
44, resided in New England, and do not have imputed values for gender, fertility, age, marital 
status, or race. 
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Table 5: Impact of Insurance Gains on Fertility 
𝐵𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑆,𝑇,𝐷 0.0017 
(0.0207) 
-0.0024 
(0.0397) 
0.0014 
(0.0268) 
-0.0446** 
(0.0227) 
0.0689* 
(0.0498) 
-0.0094 
(0.0354) 
N 510,707 79,350 210,970 114,522 96,448 220,387 
𝐵2 0.0782 0.0402 0.0659 0.0531 0.0161 0.0353 
Fertility rate 
(pre-reform) 
0.0792 0.0141 0.1301 0.0588 0.2017 0.0552 
Sample All Ages 15 to 
19 
Ages 20-
34 
Ages 20-
34, 
Unmarried 
Ages 20-
34, 
Married 
Ages 35 to 
44 
Notes: All standard errors are clustered at the STATE*YEAR*DEMOG level. The “pre” period 
is 2003-2006 and the “post” period is 2008-2011. The treatment state is Massachusetts, and the 
control states are Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Dependent 
variable is: “Has this person given birth to any children in the past 12 months?” Individual 
controls included in regression are: education (dropout, high school graduate, college graduate), 
non-mover, military service, and non-citizen. Women are included in the analysis if they are 
aged 15-44, resided in New England, and do not have imputed values for gender, fertility, age, 
marital status, or race. All specifications include STATE fixed effects (6 categories), YEAR 
fixed effects (8 categories) and DEMOG fixed effects (48 categories – 2 groups for marital status 
x 4 groups for poverty status x 6 groups for age status). 
 
** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level (one-tailed test) 
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Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis 
 Age 20-34, Unmarried 
(N=114,552; Pre-reform fertility rate=0.0588) 
 
𝐵𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑆,𝑇,𝐷 -0.0446** 
(0.0227) 
-0.0535** 
(0.0270) 
-0.0666*** 
(0.0274) 
-0.0598* 
(0.0393) 
-0.0393 
(0.0436) 
𝐵2 0.0531 0.0533 0.0540 0.0558 0.0585 
 Age 20-34, Married  
(N=96,448; Pre-reform fertility rate=0.2017) 
 
𝐵𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑆,𝑇,𝐷 0.0689* 
(0.0498) 
0.0680* 
(0.0495) 
0.0713* 
(0.0494) 
0.0811* 
(0.0513) 
0.0756 
(0.0640) 
𝐵2 0.0161 0.0163 0.0174 0.0198 0.0231 
Interaction 
Terms 
STATE, 
YEAR, 
DEMOG 
(Table 5) 
STATE, 
YEAR, 
State 
trends, 
DEMOG 
STATE*YEAR, 
DEMOG 
STATE*YEAR, 
DEMOG*YEAR 
STATE*YEAR, 
DEMOG*YEAR, 
DEMOG*STATE 
Notes: All standard errors are clustered at the STATE*YEAR*DEMOG level. The “pre” period is 2003-
2006 and the “post” period is 2008-2011. The treatment state is Massachusetts, and the control states are 
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Dependent variable is: “Has this 
person given birth to any children in the past 12 months?” Individual controls included in regression are: 
education (dropout, high school graduate, college graduate), non-mover, military service, and non-citizen. 
Women are included in the analysis if they are aged 20-34, resided in New England, and do not have 
imputed values for gender, fertility, age, marital status, or race. 
 
** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level (one-tailed test) 
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Table 7: Does Marital Status Affect Pregnancy Wantedness? 
  (1) 
No 
controls 
(2) 
Plus 
Mother’s 
Age 
(3) 
Plus 
Mother’s 
Education 
(4) 
Plus 
Mother’s 
Race 
(5) 
Plus 
Previous 
Births 
(6) 
Plus 
Insurance 
Status 
 
Coefficient 
on 
“Married?” 
15-44 
Year Olds 
0.380*** 
(0.008) 
0.273*** 
(0.010) 
0.253*** 
(0.010) 
0.252*** 
(0.011) 
0.254*** 
(0.011) 
0.253*** 
(0.012) 
N 
 
45,059 45,059 44,264 44,062 43,789 31,290 
20 to 24 
Year Olds 
0.246*** 
(0.019) 
--- 0.255*** 
(0.019) 
0.255*** 
(0.019) 
0.258*** 
(0.020) 
0.283*** 
(0.022) 
N 
 
9,594  9,423 9,370 9,314 6,777 
25 to 29 
Year Olds 
0.322*** 
(0.016) 
--- 0.300*** 
(0.018) 
0.300*** 
(0.018) 
0.302*** 
(0.018) 
0.270*** 
(0.022) 
N 
 
12,351  12,171 12,113 12,036 8,490 
30 to 34 
Year Olds 
0.263*** 
(0.022) 
--- 0.218*** 
(0.023) 
0.213*** 
(0.023) 
0.209*** 
(0.023) 
0.205*** 
(0.027) 
N 
 
11,861  11,659 11,614 11,549 8,179 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Omitted categories for added controls: (2) over 40 years old, (3) 0-
8 years of education, (4) non-white; (6) uninsured. 
 
*** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level. Weighted. 
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Table 8: Does Health Insurance Affect Access to Primary Care Physician? 
  (1) 
No controls 
(2) 
Plus Income 
(3) 
Plus 
Employment 
Status 
 
(4) 
Plus Age 
Coefficient on 
“Has Health 
Insurance?” 
Entire Sample 
(N=32,669) 
 
0.333*** 
(0.015) 
0.287*** 
(0.013) 
0.286*** 
(0.013) 
0.286*** 
(0.013) 
Married 
(N=18,713) 
 
0.325*** 
(0.019) 
0.262*** 
(0.016) 
0.262*** 
(0.016) 
0.263*** 
(0.016) 
Single 
(N=13,956) 
0.326*** 
(0.015) 
0.302*** 
(0.015) 
0.302*** 
(0.015) 
0.301*** 
(0.015) 
  (5) 
Plus Health 
Status 
(6) 
Plus Disability 
(7) 
Plus Education 
(8) 
Plus Marital 
Status 
Coefficient on 
“Has Health 
Insurance?” 
Entire Sample 
(N=32,669) 
 
0.286*** 
(0.013) 
0.295*** 
(0.013) 
0.281*** 
(0.013) 
0.281*** 
(0.013) 
Married 
(N=18,713) 
 
0.263*** 
(0.016) 
0.262*** 
(0.015) 
0.257*** 
(0.016) 
--- 
Single 
(N=13,956) 
0.301*** 
(0.014) 
0.300*** 
(0.014) 
0.299*** 
(0.014) 
--- 
Notes Regressions (1) – (8) exclude women of childbearing age who are using permanent contraception 
methods like tied tubes and hysterectomy or whose partner is using permanent contraception methods like 
vasectomy. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at state level). Omitted categories for added controls: 
(2) less than $10,000, (3) unemployed, (5) in bad health; (6) not having a disability, (7) never attended 
school, (8) single. For the entire sample, 80.9 percent have access to a primary care physician; among 
married women it is 84.0 percent and among single women it is 76.6 percent. 
 
*** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level 
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Table 9: Does Access to Primary Care Physicians Affect Contraception Use? 
  Any Contraception Use? 
 (1) 
No controls 
(2) 
Plus Age 
(3) 
Plus 
Education 
(4) 
Plus Marital 
Status 
(5) 
Plus 
Number of 
Children 
 
Coefficient 
on “Access 
to Primary 
Care 
Physician?” 
Entire 
Sample 
(N=32,669) 
 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.049*** 
(0.007) 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
0.043*** 
(0.007) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
Married 
(N=18,713) 
 
0.035*** 
(0.010) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
0.040*** 
(0.010) 
--- 0.031*** 
(0.010) 
Single 
(N=13,956) 
0.042*** 
(0.009) 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
0.048*** 
(0.009) 
--- 0.048*** 
(0.009) 
  Effective Contraception Use? 
 (1) 
No controls 
(2) 
Plus Age 
(3) 
Plus 
Education 
(4) 
Plus Marital 
Status 
(5) 
Plus 
Number of 
Children 
 
Coefficient 
on “Access 
to Primary 
Care 
Physician?” 
Entire 
Sample 
(N=32,669) 
 
0.067*** 
(0.008) 
0.095*** 
(0.007) 
0.086*** 
(0.007) 
0.091*** 
(0.007) 
0.089*** 
(0.007) 
Married 
(N=18,713) 
 
0.058** 
(0.010) 
0.080*** 
(0.009) 
0.074*** 
(0.009) 
--- 0.071*** 
(0.009) 
Single 
(N=13,956) 
0.010*** 
(0.010) 
0.121*** 
(0.011) 
0.109*** 
(0.011) 
--- 0.109*** 
(0.011) 
Notes: Specifications (1)-(5) exclude women of childbearing age who are using permanent contraception 
methods like tied tubes and hysterectomy or whose partner is using permanent contraception methods like 
vasectomy. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the state level). Columns (1) through (5) show 
regressions results with incrementally added controls. Omitted categories for added controls: (3) never 
attended school (4) single. For the entire sample, 72.6 percent use contraception; among married women 
it is 67.8 percent and among single women it is 79.1 percent. For the entire sample, 47.8 percent use 
effective contraception; among married women it is 43.8 percent and among single women it is 53.2 
percent. 
 
*** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level, * = significant at 10% level 
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Figure 1: Expected Fertility Effects by Age, Marital Status and Gains In Insurance Coverage 
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Figure 2: Insurance Coverage Rates By Age Group 
2a: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2003-2006 
 
2b: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2008-2011 
 
2c: Changes in Coverage Rates 
 
 
  
78 83 88 93 98
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
Insured rate 
A
ge
 G
ro
up
 
Rest of New England Massachusetts
78 83 88 93 98
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
Insured rate 
A
ge
 G
ro
up
 
Rest of New England Massachusetts
-5 0 5 10 15
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
Change in insured rate 
A
ge
 G
ro
up
 
Rest of New England Massachusetts
46 
 
Figure 3: Insurance Coverage Rates By Marital Status 
3a: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2003-2006 
 
3b: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2008-2011 
 
3c: Changes in Coverage Rates 
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Figure 4: Insurance Coverage Rates By Income Group 
4a: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2003-2006 
 
4b: Massachusetts vs. rest of New England, 2008-2011 
 
4c: Changes in Coverage Rates 
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Figure 5: Fertility Rates 
5a: Fertility Rates by Age, 2003 
 
5b: Fertility Rates by Age/Marital Status, 2003 
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Figure 6: Differential Pre-Existing, Pre-Program Trends in Fertility Rates? 
6a: Married Women in ACS, Aged 20-34 
 
6b: Single Women in ACS, Aged 20-34 
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Figure 7: Pregnancy Wantedness by Marital Status 
7a. Live Births Only 
 
7b. Live Births and Abortions 
 
Notes: Authors’ tabulations using data from the Guttmacher Institute and the PRAMS survey using 
weighted data for Massachusetts (2007-2011), Vermont (2003-2011), Maine (2003-2011), and Rhode 
Island (2003-2011). 
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